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 1
The Diplomacy of Resistance:  
Power, Hegemony and Nuclear Disarmament 
 
 
The humanitarian initiative for nuclear disarmament has challenged and transformed global 
nuclear politics. Aimed at delegitimising nuclear weapons as acceptable instruments of 
statecraft, the initiative has been backed by many civil society organisations and most non-
nuclear-weapon states. The nuclear-armed states, however, have opposed the initiative, 
accusing it of undermining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and destabilising nuclear 
politics. Conceptualising a ‘diplomacy of resistance’, this article positions the humanitarian 
initiative as a transnational social movement and traces its development through practices of 
resistance and counter-resistance. Drawing on Robert Cox’s conception of resistance as 
counter-hegemonic and Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall’s taxonomy of power, the 
article explores the nexus of power and resistance in global nuclear politics. We explain the 
humanitarian movement’s specific aims and practices as a function of its champion’s relative 
political weakness vis-à-vis the nuclear armed states. The movement’s coherence and 
effectiveness, in turn, was fostered by a coalitional logic that allowed different identities of 
resistance to be steered towards a nuclear ban treaty within the UN’s institutional framework.  
 
Keywords: nuclear weapons, power, diplomacy, resistance, disarmament 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The rise to power of Donald J. Trump immediately provoked ‘resistance’ by groups threatened 
by his regime. From the ‘Women’s March on Washington’ to countless White House leaks and 
the Boycott Trump! Campaign, concerned citizens have opted to use unorthodox means to 
minimise the president’s political influence. But resistance, of course, is nothing new. Formed in 
response to the inauguration of Trump’s predecessor, the Tea Party movement would resist the 
Obama administration’s every move for the next eight years. Ghandi’s ‘passive resistance’ to 
British rule in India catalysed the dismantlement of the European empires in the 1950s and 60s. 
Resistance movements during World War II were instrumental in bringing down Nazi Germany. 
Power, it seems, invariably fosters resistance, particularly when it is viewed as illegitimate. 
 Studies of power and resistance have tended to concentrate on domestic politics, that is, 
on how central authorities are resisted from ‘below’. But resistance is not limited to the domestic 
sphere. In this article, we investigate the power–resistance nexus in international politics through 
the ‘humanitarian initiative’ on nuclear weapons and, in doing so, develop the concept of a 
‘diplomacy of resistance’. Our core argument is that the humanitarian initiative and attendant 
effort by a large group of non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWSs) and civil society actors to 
institute a global ban on nuclear weapons constitutes a process of collective resistance to 
entrenched power structures perpetuating the existence of nuclear weapons. We trace the forms 
of power being resisted and the forms of power exercised through and within the humanitarian 
initiative as a social movement. We argue that this movement corresponds closely to the form 
and function of a transnational advocacy network (TAN).1 In doing so, the article makes the 
following three contributions to the literature on power, resistance and TANs: First, drawing on 
the taxonomy of power developed by IR theorists Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, we 
                                                
1 Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1998), 1–38. 
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 2
show that power and resistance should not be understood as opposites or as chains in a cause–
effect relationship.2 Instead, different forms, or assemblages, of power create the conditions for 
different forms of action, some of which are captured by the idea of resistance. Second, 
conceptualising a ‘diplomacy of resistance’, we highlight the ways in which diplomatic actors, 
institutions and practices are integral to what we identify as ‘resistance’ in global nuclear politics. 
We develop this through an explicit engagement with power that adds an important layer of 
understanding to existing accounts of TANs. Reading such networks as a form of resistance 
provides insights into the dynamics of contestation in multilateral diplomacy, the ways in which 
power is manifested in international relations and the relationships between action, legitimacy 
and international institutions. Third, relying on Barnett and Duvall’s taxonomy, we analyse the 
practical realities of resistance in international politics. We find that the humanitarian initiative 
mobilised specific forms of compulsory, institutional and productive power to challenge the 
nuclear-armed states’ structural power. Here, we argue that a successful diplomacy of resistance 
involves the exercise of power both internally (within the resistance network) and externally (vis-
à-vis other actors as the objects of resistance).  
 The rest of this article is divided into three. In the first section, we discuss the 
phenomenon of resistance and its relation to power. We discuss the established major powers’ 
dominance of multilateral nuclear disarmament diplomacy and conceptualise challenges to the 
status quo as resistance. In the second section, we turn to the politics of nuclear disarmament, 
providing an in-depth case study of the ‘humanitarian initiative’ and demand for a nuclear 
weapons prohibition treaty as a resistance movement. The third part concludes.  
 
2 Analytical framework 
 
2.1 Power and resistance 
 
Power is essential to any understanding of resistance. For Michel Foucault, ‘there are no relations 
of power without resistances’.3 For our purposes, Foucault’s axiom may also be turned on its 
head: there are no resistances without relations of power. According to Barnett and Duvall, 
power and resistance are ‘mutually implicated because the social relations that shape the ability of 
actors to control their own fates are frequently challenged and resisted’. In other words, 
resistance is what takes place on the ‘receiving end of power’4. Thus conceived, a taxonomy of 
resistance flows naturally from the taxonomy of power that Barnett and Duvall have developed.5  
Power, for Barnett and Duvall, is understood in term of social relations. It is a process 
rather than an attribute that they divide into four types: compulsory, institutional, structural and 
productive. Their first of these, ‘compulsory power’, refers to an actor’s exercise of ‘direct 
control’ of another through threat, coercion and compellance. In international relations, direct 
                                                
2 See Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, ‘Power in Global Governance’, in Power in Global Governance, eds Barnett 
and Duvall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) and Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, ‘Power in 
International Politics’, International Organization 59, no. 1 (2005). 
3 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge (New York: Pantheon, 1980), 142. 
4 Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, ‘Power in Global Governance’, in Power in Global Governance, eds Barnett and 
Duvall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 22. 
5 Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, ‘Power in Global Governance’, in Power in Global Governance, eds Barnett and 
Duvall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 22. 
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 3
control is most dramatically demonstrated through coercive military domination. In global 
nuclear politics, the five nuclear-weapon states (NWSs) defined as such by the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) have at their disposal military and technological assets far superior to 
most NNWSs, including the capacity to threaten nuclear violence. Combined, the military 
expenditure of these five amounts to approximately 60 per cent of the world’s total military 
expenditure.6 At least some NWSs have regularly used compulsory power in so-called counter-
proliferation operations to police the nuclear order, as when a ‘coalition of the willing’ led by the 
United States and Britain invaded Iraq in 2003 on the pretext of stripping it of weapons of mass 
destruction. Compulsory power may also be exercised through inaction, as when one actor self-
censors its behaviour out of fear of suffering consequences should it fail to do so. The 
fundamental claim of nuclear deterrence theory, for instance, is that potential aggressors stay 
their aggression out of fear of being subjected to nuclear violence. Barnett and Duvall claim that 
compulsory power generates attempts by those on the receiving end to access the resources or 
attributes that will enable them to neutralise it through their own reciprocal compulsory power.  
Barnett and Duvall’s second category of power is ‘institutional’. Institutional power refers 
to an actor’s ability to indirectly influence the behaviour of ‘socially distant others’ through legal 
rules and institutions. Unlike compulsory power, which works through ‘direct’ control, 
institutional power is mediated through ‘diffuse’ control via an institution. An example of 
institutional power of particular relevance to this article is the power vested in the 1968 NPT, 
through which the five states that had tested nuclear weapons by 1 January 1967 have 
successfully legitimised their own possession of nuclear weapons while at the same time 
delegitimising their acquisition by others.7 Their legal status as ‘nuclear-weapon states’ is often 
interpreted (particularly by themselves) as a permanent and legitimate entitlement to possess 
nuclear weapons.8 Institutional power, Barnett and Duvall claim, fosters resistance in the form of 
attempts to alter ‘the rules of the game’. They note the overt challenge to the nuclear non-
proliferation regime posed by India and Pakistan, as well as efforts by civil society organisations 
to advance women’s rights within the context of human rights law as examples of resistance to 
institutional power by challenging the institutions in question.  
The third and fourth types of power are ‘structural’ and ‘productive’ power. Unlike 
compulsory and institutional power, which have a form of coercive or constraining causal effect, 
structural and productive power influence actors through the constitution of their opportunities, 
interests and identities. Structural power involves the direct conditioning of specific actors’ roles 
and opportunities through economic and political relations that advantage some and disadvantage 
others. The structural power enjoyed by the NWSs is significant. It takes the form of an 
oligarchic nuclear social structure that empowers the combined ‘great power’ role of permanent 
membership of the UN Security Council and NPT ‘nuclear-weapon state’ and disempowers non-
NWSs and non-UNSC states. This nuclear social structure is embedded within global and 
hierarchical structures of capitalism and patriarchy. On the receiving end, structural power 
generates attempts by those in ‘subordinate structural positions to reduce the inequality that 
                                                
6 Sam Perlo-Freeman et al., ‘Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2015’ (Stockholm: SIPRI, April 2016), 2. 
7 Nick Ritchie, ‘Waiting for Kant’, International Affairs 90, no. 3 (2014); Asli Ü. Bâli, ‘Legality and Legitimacy in the 
Global Order’, in Legality and Legitimacy in Global Affairs, eds Richard Falk, Mark Juergensmeyer, Vesselin Popovski 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
8 Nick Ritchie, ‘Legitimizing and Delegitimizing Nuclear Weapons’, in Viewing Nuclear Weapons through a Humanitarian 
Lens, eds John Borrie and Tim Caughley (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2013), 48–9. 
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 4
inheres in that relationship, as well as potentially to transform the structures that sustain it.’9 
Barnett and Duvall describe transnationally coordinated labour and anti-globalisation campaigns, 
as well as the push by developing states for a New International Economic Order during the 
1970s as examples of this type of resistance. In the field of disarmament diplomacy, the repeated 
initiatives by groups of non-aligned states to ‘democratise disarmament’ and the efforts of peace 
groups and many NNWSs at increasing the possibilities for active engagement of civil society 
organisations in diplomatic processes provide examples of resistance to the structural power of 
the nuclear weapon states afforded by their ‘structural positions’.10 
Lastly, ‘productive’ or ‘discursive’11 power describes the way in which diffuse political 
domination is embedded in everyday practices, cultural narratives and discourses that set the 
parameters for political action and determine what counts as legitimate knowledge. Constituting 
actors as well as the world they inhabit, productive power is analogous to the Italian Marxist 
thinker Antonio Gramsci’s concept of ‘hegemony’ – the ability of the ruling class to impose its 
definition of reality on the working class.12 Key to this is Gramsci’s notion of ‘common sense’, by 
which he referred to the set of values, norms and ideas that had become largely accepted in 
society and thereby constituted a hegemonic ideology.13 In mainstream academic and media 
circles, nuclear security is often equated with nuclear non-proliferation; existing weapons – in 
particular those of the Western NWSs at the forefront of the non-proliferation agenda – are 
seldom seen as part of the problem.14 In fact, the doctrine of nuclear deterrence as something 
practiced ‘responsibly’ by the established nuclear-armed states is routinely held up as the 
underlying cause of the ‘long peace’ between major powers after the end of World War II.15 This 
nuclear peace hypothesis has now become conventional wisdom in many parts of the world.16 
Attention to the dynamics of productive power/resistance has traditionally been the business of 
poststructuralist thinkers. For Michel Foucault, for example, ‘resistance was never about an escape 
or an overcoming of power relations, but about refashioning the subject within power’.17 In the 
realm of nuclear politics, feminists have engaged in this refashioning by exposing the 
genderedness of nuclear discourse and policy, whilst Gusterson has exposed the Orientalist 
foundations of Western nuclear discourse.18 The humanitarian initiative constituted an attempt at 
                                                
9 Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, ‘Power in Global Governance’, in Power in Global Governance, eds Barnett and 
Duval (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 23. 
10 Dimitris Bourantonis, ‘Democratization, Decentralization, and Disarmament at the United Nations’, The 
International History Review 15, no. 4 (1993); Lawrence S. Wittner, ‘The Forgotten Years of the World Nuclear 
Disarmament Movement, 1975–78’, Journal of Peace Research 40, no. 4 (2003). 
11 Stephen Gill, Power and Resistance in the New World Order (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), xiv. 
12 Joseph V. Femia, Gramsci’s Political Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 23–4. 
13 See Mark Rupert, ‘Globalising common sense: a Marxian-Gramscian (re-)vision of the politics͒of 
governance/resistance’, Review of International Studies, 29 (2003): 181–98. 
14 See Ritu Mathur, ‘Sly civility and the paradox of equality/inequality in the nuclear order’, Critical Studies on Security 4, 
no. 1 (2015); Campbell Craig and Jan Ruzicka, ‘The Nonproliferation Complex’, Ethics & International Affairs 27, no. 
3 (2013).  
15 For a discussion of ‘responsible nuclear sovereignty’ see William Walker, ‘The UK, Threshold Status, and 
Responsible Nuclear Sovereignty’, International Affairs 86, no. 2 (2010). 
16 Benôit Pelopidas, ‘A Bet Portrayed as a Certainty’, in The War That Must Never Be Fought, eds Gorge P. Schultz and 
James E. Goodby (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2015). 
17 James Brassett, ‘British Comedy, Global Resistance’, European Journal of International Relations 22, no. 1 (2016): 174. 
Emphasis original. 
18 E.g. Jean B. Elshtain, ‘Reflections on War and Political Discourse’, Political Theory 13, no. 1 (1985); Carol Cohn, 
‘Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defence Intellectuals’, Signs 12, no. 4 (1987); Hugh Gusterson, ‘Nuclear 
Weapons and the Other in the Western Imagination’, Cultural Anthropology 14, no. 1 (1999). 
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 5
‘reframing’ the diplomatic debate on nuclear disarmament from a state security- and deterrence-
oriented discussion to one based more firmly on humanitarian imperatives and human security, 
thereby ‘reconstituting’ nuclear actors in ways that change power relationships, as we explore 
further below.19  
We find that Barnett and Duvall’s taxonomy of power and resistance provides an 
excellent starting point for analysing the nexus of power and resistance in nuclear politics. 
However, their conceptualisation of resistance is unrefined. First, their binary distinction between 
power and resistance appears too simplistic. As we see it, power and resistance are neither 
separate phenomena nor chains in a simple cause–effect relationship. Building on a wider critique 
of traditional accounts of resistance, dissent and global civil society as too willing to treat ‘global 
power and global resistance as discrete and separate objects of analysis’,20 we understand power 
and resistance as ‘entangled’ in complex social relations.21 For example, an actor’s ability to resist 
is itself a function of that actor’s power – its ‘power to resist’. And although it is often the case 
that power is exercised by the ‘strong’ and resisted by the ‘weak’, domination is often maintained 
by hegemonic resistance to emancipatory processes.22 Indeed, the ability of the ‘strong’ to 
mobilise effective counter-resistance is a crucial aspect of their strength. Second, Barnett and 
Duvall’s suggestion that power fosters resistance in its own image – that the exercising of 
compulsory power generates compulsory resistance and institutional power institutional resistance and so 
on – strikes us as empirically incorrect. In fact, the exercising or manifestation of one form of 
power – whether compulsory, institutional, structural or productive – often fosters resistance in 
the form of another. For example, imperial officers’ use of compulsory power against colonial 
subjects was often resisted through art and literature that actualised productive power.23 Religious 
fundamentalists regularly seek to resist the productive and structural power of the ‘West’ by 
compulsory means.24 In the post-Cold War period, American compulsory power has often been 
resisted through ‘soft balancing’ initiatives aimed at changing or deepening international law.25  
We argue that while it is useful to understand resistance as ‘that which happens on the 
receiving end of power’, practices of resistance are entangled in power structures and cannot be 
readily differentiated into corresponding categories of power/resistance. One must in any case 
distinguish between (1) the power structures and practices that generate or motivate resistance 
(i.e. the ‘grounds’ for resistance), (2) the power structures and practices resistors target or seek to 
change (i.e. the ‘ends’ of resistance) and (3) the enactment of resista ce through practices that 
constitute different forms of power (i.e. the ‘means’ of resistance, sometimes referred to as a 
‘repertoire of contention’26). 
 
2.2 Defining resistance 
 
                                                
19 Espen B. Eide, Chair’s Summary of the Oslo Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, 5 
March 2013, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/nuclear_summary/id716343/. 
20 Lara M. Coleman and Karen Tucker, ‘Between Discipline and Dissent’, Globalizations 8, no. 4 (2011): 400. 
21 Joanne P. Sharp et al., Entanglements of Power (London: Routledge, 2000), 2. 
22 See David C. Hoy, Critical Resistance (London: The MIT Press, 2004), 2. 
23 E.g. Charles Tripp, The Power and the People (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
24 Mike Smith, Boko Haram (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015). 
25 See e.g. T.V. Paul, ‘Soft Balancing in the Age of US Primacy’, International Security 30, no. 1 (2005). 
26 Charles Tilly, The Contentious French (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986). 
Page 5 of 25
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cpar
Global Change, Peace & Security
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 O
nly
DRAFT – NOT FOR CIRCULATION!
 
 6
We view resistance as a ‘practice’.27 We are not the first to do this. James Brassett, for example, 
conceives of resistance as a ‘performative’ ‘ethico-political’ practice.28 Our approach is slightly 
different. Heeding Morten Andersen and Iver Neumann’s call to study practices as models rather 
than as conscious performances, we see the ‘practice of resistance’ first and foremost as an analytical 
construct.29 This is not to say that resistance is not an empirical phenomenon – it is – only that its 
occurrence is determined by us, the researchers, and not necessarily those who practice it. While 
some of the individuals involved in the behaviour we describe readily see themselves as engaged 
in ‘resistance’, others might not recognise such a classification. We also recognise that defining 
what is being resisted, who the resistors are and who is being empowered is a contested process.30 
A useful starting point for understanding how resistance is practiced in international 
politics is to consider what it is that is being resisted. In the case of the humanitarian initiative, 
the focus of resistance, in our view, is the set of structures and practices that selectively legitimise, 
regulate, and discipline the appropriation of nuclear weapons, technologies, materials and 
knowledge and, in doing so, perpetuate the risk of catastrophic nuclear violence. By this we mean 
established structures of power that privilege some states over others in terms of who is and is 
not permitted to possess certain nuclear technologies, such as weapons and enrichment plants, 
and to engage in certain practices, such as nuclear testing, nuclear deterrence and, potentially, 
nuclear use.31 Structures are understood here in a sociological sense as enduring patterns of 
relations (military, political, economic, ideological) between social actors. These often coalesce in 
formal and informal institutions and tend to reflect hierarchical power relations between 
dominant and dominated or marginalised actors. Contesting power structures tends to involve 
denaturalising and delegitimising an established set of ideas, values, institutions and practices and 
legitimising of a different set based on an alternative vision of the future.32  
Robert Cox’s analysis of hegemony and counter-hegemony is helpful here. The prevailing 
power structures and practices of global nuclear politics can be described as ‘hegemonic’ in the 
sense in which Cox uses the term to describe ‘a structure of values and understandings about the 
nature of order that permeates a whole system of states and non-state entities’, one in which 
‘these values and understandings are relatively stable and unquestioned’. Hegemony derives from 
‘the ways of doing and thinking of the dominant strata of the dominant state or states’ that come 
to constitute actors both directly (structural power) and indirectly (productive power).33 Cox 
draws on Gramsci’s analysis of hegemony, class and social change. He argues that creating an 
alternative politics means building alternative institutions, developing alternative intellectual 
resources and establishing networks between subordinate groups. This means ‘actively building a 
counter-hegemony within an established hegemony whilst resisting the pressures and temptations 
to relapse into pursuit of incremental gains’.34 This parallels the experience, practices and 
                                                
27 See Iver B. Neumann, ‘Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn’, Millennium 31, no. 3 (2002): 627. 
28 James Brassett, ‘British Comedy, Global Resistance’, European Journal of International Relations 22, no. 1 (2016): 170, 
177. 
29 Morten S. Andersen and Iver B. Neumann, ‘Practices as Models’, Millennium 40, no. 3 (2012). 
30 For a discussion in relation to concept of global civil society, see Louise Amoore and Paul Langley, ‘Ambiguities of 
Global Civil Society’, Review of International Studies 30, no. 1 (2004): 105. 
31 For a more detailed discussion see Nick Ritchie ‘Understanding Global Nuclear Order, Power, and Hegemony’ 
presented at the European Initiative on Security Studies conference, 14 January 2017, University Panthéon-Assas, 
Paris. Contact the author for further details. 
32 Peter Willetts, Non-Governmental Organisation in World Politics (London: Routledge, 2011), ch. 5. 
33 Robert Cox and Timothy Sinclair, Approaches to World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
34 Robert Cox, ‘Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations’, Millennium 12, no. 2 (1983): 165. 
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 7
strategies of the humanitarian initiative as well as other TANs operating within niche policy areas 
and different contexts but embedded within broader social movements.  
What qualifies as ‘incremental gains’ over more transformative measures is open to 
debate. The humanitarian initiative as a form of resistance centres on a specific policy domain 
rather than the more expansive form of counter-hegemony envisaged by Cox to realise an 
alternative form of state and society. Nevertheless, Cox is quite clear in his discussion of 
alternative social and political orders that these alternatives are limited to those ‘which are feasible 
transformations of the existing world’ based on historical processes. ‘Improbable alternatives’ are 
rejected along with the acceptance of the permanence of the existing order.35 This is important 
because some have argued that the humanitarian initiative is not a novel or transformative 
development at all and that all it does is reproduce old narratives that cement the status quo.36 
Instead, a truly transformative move would require radical restructuring of global politics akin to 
the ideas of ‘world government’ advocated by ‘nuclear realists’ in the 1950s and 60s as the only 
solution to question of how humanity should respond to the invention of nuclear weapons.37 
Such critiques fail to understand the initiative as a form of resistance replete with discursive and 
diplomatic strategies to effect change through existing and new institutions and intellectual 
resources. 
In standard usage, ‘resistance’ describes a wide range of movements and activities 
designed to challenge, undermine or transform established power structures.38 These can be led 
by individuals, parties, NGOs, states, or multi-actor transnational coalitions and they can be 
understood as regressive or progressive. Owen Worth, for example, reminds us that resistance 
can be international or nationalist, progressive or reactionary, secular or religious, hateful or 
benevolent.39 We understand the humanitarian initiative as a multi-layered resistance movement. 
Resistance movements tend to display the following features: First, as discussed above, acts of 
resistance oppose or challenge existing or emergent power, whether compulsory, institutional, 
structural or productive. The possibilities for successful resistance, however, is itself a function of 
the resistors’ ability to exercise power. Second, resistance movements tend to rely on creativity 
and unorthodox methods to level the playing field with the powers that be by changing the 
structure and rules of the game.40 Resistors’ means or ‘repertoire of contention’ – striking, 
conceptual reframing, social media campaigning, violence – will typically be determined by norms 
and social mores, comparative advantages and opportunity costs, actors’ agendas and identities, 
available resources and the responses of the powerful.41 Third, the aims of resistance are typically 
couched in normative claims that contest the legitimacy of extant practices and power structures. 
Resistance from this standpoint is often mobilised by a sense of common struggle and solidarity 
against injustice and oppression, giving voice to the marginalise and silenced, and faith in the 
                                                
35 Robert Cox, ‘Social Forces, States, and World Orders’, Millennium 10, no. 2 (1982): 130. 
36 For example, Laura Considine, ‘The “standardization of catastrophe”: Nuclear disarmament, the Humanitarian 
Initiative and the politics of the unthinkable’, Millennium 23, no. 3 (2016). 
37 See Rens van Munster and Casper Sylvest, ‘Reclaiming nuclear politics? Nuclear realism, the H-bomb and 
globality’, Security Dialogue 45, no. 6 (2015).͒ 
38 For example, the collection in eds David Armstrong, Theo Farrell and Bice Maiguashca, Governance and Resistance in 
World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
39 Owen Worth, Rethinking Hegemony (London: Palgrave, 2015), 153. 
40 Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1998), 1–38. 
41 Charles Tilly, The Contentious French (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986). 
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 8
possibility of change through an alternative vision of politics. Resistance to the major powers’ 
nuclear hegemony, for example, has traditionally been justified through a mix of cosmopolitan 
understandings of international order and security, Third World solidarity and the nuclear-
weapon states’ legal obligation to disarm. Resistance, then, is generally a positive ‘resistance for’ 
some emancipatory change (whether reform, a Gramscian ‘passive revolution’, or more 
transformative, revolutionary change) though it can be limited to an identity-based or negative 
‘resistance against’ something.42  
Several historical and ongoing disarmament movements display the three features 
described above. Activities and campaigns as diverse as the ‘Sahara marches’ against French 
nuclear testing in the late 1950s and early 1960s,43 the Mexican government’s blocking of 
consensus at the 1990 NPT Review Conference,44 the long campaign for a comprehensive ban 
against nuclear testing, the ‘nuclear freeze movement’ of the early 1980s and the intermittent 
demonstrations against nuclear-weapons convoys on Scottish roads may all be understood as 
forms of resistance.45 We argue that a particularly powerful form of resistance in nuclear politics 
is the mobilisation of TANs. Such movements are often aimed at specific, limited objectives, but 
may be understood more broadly as concerted efforts by a diverse constellation of actors to 
challenge entrenched power structures, particularly the injustice, inequality and dangers of the 
NPT nuclear control regime. The construction of nuclear danger has been a central feature of the 
humanitarian initiative. Transnational advocacy networks are often reduced to the activities of 
NGOs and ‘global civil society’. But as Keck and Sikkink argue, TANs are not just civil society 
phenomena. The humanitarian initiative TAN, for example, encompasses overlapping networks 
of NGOs, IGOs, the Hibakusha, think-tanks, diplomats, policy-makers, parliamentarians, UN 
agencies, religious bodies, protest groups, and so on. The humanitarian initiative TAN should 
therefore be understood as a network of networks. The most prominent of these was the NGO 
network orchestrated by ICAN. The inter-governmental network(s) of the humanitarian initiative 
are far less visible. It is the extent to which this network of networks has engaged in official 
diplomatic arenas that we identify a ‘diplomacy of resistance’.   
In addition to displaying the three features of resistance described above (opposition to 
extant or emergent power structures; creativity; normative anchoring), the diplomacy of 
resistance may be identified by more specific traits. First, although resistance may ‘be expressed 
in multifaceted ways and in diverse locations’,46 what we describe as the diplomacy of resistance is 
fully or in part enacted in and through traditional diplomatic arenas like formal multilateral 
conferences and informal ‘track-II’ meetings and is aimed, fully or in part, at influencing public 
(international) policy. Formal diplomatic arenas are generally inclusive and established state-based 
sites of institutional power. These sites, such as NPT review conferences, offer limited access to 
non-state actors and networks, but the focus on the state and affecting state narratives, policies, 
and behaviours through state-based international institutions is central. Opportunities for 
                                                
42 William DeMars and Dennis Dijkzeul, ‘Introduction: NGOing’, in The NGO Challenge for International Relations 
Theory, eds DeMars and Dijkzeul (London: Routledge, 2015); Robert Cox, ‘Gramsci, Hegemony and International 
Relations’, Millennium 12, no. 2 (1983). 
43 See Jean Allman, ‘Nuclear Imperialism and the Pan-African Struggle for Peace and Freedom’, Souls 10, no. 2 
(2008). 
44 See Rebecca Johnson, Unfinished Business (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2009), 34. 
45 See e.g. The Scotsman, ‘Pensioner Stops Nuclear Weapon Convoy in Stirling’, 16 September 2016, 
http://www.scotsman.com/news/video-pensioner-stops-nuclear-weapon-convoy-in-stirling-1-4232337. 
46 Catherine Eschle and Bice Maiguascha, ‘Rethinking Globalised Resistance’, British Journal of Politics and International 
Relations 9, no. 2 (2007): 296. 
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 9
participation empowers ‘global civil society’ but at the same time legitimises the practices of 
states and state-based international institutions.  
Second, the diplomacy of resistance is usually heterogeneous. While resistance 
movements are typically united by a core set of ‘principled ideas’ or values,47 TANs are able to 
mobilise and align a plurality of actors that have latent agendas of their own.48 What brings them 
together is a focus on change through state-centric strategies of diplomatic engagement.  
Third, possibilities for resistance are shaped by past experiences that have generated 
significant change through disarmament diplomacy. It is a well-documented empirical tendency 
that resistance and protest activities cluster temporally in a cyclical fashion.
49
 The concept of 
protest cycles has been used productively in analyses of waves of mobilisation in domestic 
affairs, including labour strikes,
50
 secessionism,
51
 and peace movements, 
52
 and the history of 
multilateral nuclear disarmament diplomacy is sprinkled with cycles of protest and 
resistance.
53
 Formative experiences from previous cycles that supported the humanitarian 
initiative include the mobilisation of movements to end nuclear testing, to authorise an advisory 
opinion on the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the International Court of Justice, to prohibit 
anti-personnel landmines and later to prohibit cluster munitions. These in turn were shaped by 
broader shifts in the salience of rights in global politics, the diffusion of power to a plurality of 
state and non-state actors, changing conceptions of unacceptable harm to civilians in conflict, 
contagious frustration with the slow pace of nuclear stockpile reductions and the slow but steady 
empowerment of women and gender perspectives in disarmament diplomacy. The broader 
context here is how the capacity for extraordinary levels of rapid and incontestable violence has 
generated deep and abiding concern about the use, spread, testing and existence nuclear weapons, 
even as they were being invented through the Manhattan Project.54 This has left nuclear politics 
open to multiple contestations and resistances through the nuclear age.  
Fourth, the diplomacy of resistance tends to connect the object of resistance with wider 
structures and global political challenges. In nuclear politics, those engaged in the diplomacy of 
resistance have connected nuclear structures of power, nuclear inequalities and nuclear violence with 
a wider set of global structural hierarchies, inequalities and violent practices.55 For example, 
individuals working to further the humanitarian initiative have drawn connections between 
nuclear politics and global environmental, post-colonial, militarist and gendered power structures. 
                                                
47 Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘Transnational Advocacy Networks in International and Regional Politics’, 
International Social Science Journal 51, no. 159 (1999).  
48 William DeMars and Dennis Dijkzeul, ‘Introduction: NGOing’, in The NGO Challenge for International Relations 
Theory, eds DeMars and Dijkzeul (London: Routledge, 2015). 
49 David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, ‘Master Frames and Cycles of Protest’, in Frontiers in Social Movement Theory, 
eds Aldon D. Morris and Carol M. Mueller (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1992), 133. 
50 Sidney Tarrow, ‘Cycles of Collective Action’, Social Science History 17, no. 2 (1993): 284. 
51 E.g. Benjamín Tejerina, ‘Protest Cycle, Political Violence and Social Movements in the Basque Country’, Nations 
and Nationalism 7, no. 1 (2001). 
52 E.g. David S. Meyer, ‘Protest Cycles and Political Process: American Peace Movements in the Nuclear Age’, 
Political Research Quarterly 46, no. 3 (1993): 452. 
53 Kjølv Egeland, ‘Punctuated Equilibrium in Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament’, Peace Review 28, no. 3 (2016). 
54 For example, Nina Tannenwald, ‘The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of͒Nuclear 
Non-Use’, International Security 53, no. 3 (1999). 
55 See Hugh Gusterson, ‘Nuclear Weapons and the Other in the Western Imagination’, Cultural Anthropology 14, no. 1 
(1999). 
Page 9 of 25
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cpar
Global Change, Peace & Security
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 O
nly
DRAFT – NOT FOR CIRCULATION!
 
 10
This is a familiar process understood in social movement theory and NGO studies as ‘bridging’56 
or ‘linkage’57: building transnational networks with multiple partners in overlapping issue areas 
across national–international, society–state and public–private divisions. The International 
Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), one of the key actors of the humanitarian 
initiative, acknowledged that a humanitarian approach to nuclear weapons would allow them to 
‘tap new constituencies and broaden the movement working against nuclear weapons’.58 
Fifth, the diplomacy of resistance is characterised by a broadening sensitivity to the ways 
in which gender connects with disarmament diplomacy. This has been particularly important for 
the humanitarian initiative in a number of ways. First, the challenge to the structural power of 
nuclear weapons in global politics has been linked to a broader challenge to militarism and its 
connections with patriarchy.59 Second, women (as agents) and gender (as a power structure and 
subject of discussion) have become much more visible in the discourses, agendas and practices of 
nuclear disarmament diplomacy. Women and feminists have a long track record in nuclear 
protest and disarmament, but this has not corresponded to equal representation of women in 
disarmament diplomacy or gender as a focus of disarmament diplomacy.60 That has changed 
through the humanitarian initiative and broader political changes, such as the growing demand 
for women to be represented on diplomatic and academic expert panels and related discussions,61 
the comprehensive incorporation of gender perspectives across the foreign policies of states such 
as Ireland and Sweden, the adoption of the landmark UN Security Resolution 1325 on women, 
peace and security in 2000, greater access to diplomatic processes of civil society organisations, 
many of which are either led by women or have high profile female experts, and foregrounding 
gender in analysis and advocacy.62 Third, the discourse on the humanitarian effects of nuclear 
weapons has linked to women’s rights, conflict and development, where a focus on gender has 
become embedded and brought the specific effects of nuclear violence on women and girls to the 
fore. 
 
3 The humanitarian initiative: resisting nuclear hegemony!
 
                                                
56 William DeMars and Dennis Dijkzeul, ‘Introduction: NGOing’, in The NGO Challenge for International Relations 
Theory, eds DeMars and Dijkzeul (London: Routledge, 2015), 5. 
57 Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘Transnational Advocacy Networks in International and Regional Politics’, 
International Social Science Journal 51, no. 159 (1999): 93. 
58 Magnus Løvold, Beatrice Fihn and Thomas Nash, ‘Humanitarian Perspectives and the Campaign for an 
International Ban on Nuclear Weapons’, in Viewing Nuclear Weapons Through a Humanitarian Lens, eds John Borrie and 
Tim Caughley (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2013), 147. 
59 Carol Cohn, Felicity Hill and Sara Ruddick, ‘The Relevance of Gender for Eliminating Weapons of Mass 
Destruction’, Stockholm (December 2005).  
60 John Borrie et al., Gender, Development and Nuclear Weapons (Olso and Geneva: ILPI and the UNIDIR, 2016). 
61 Article 36, ‘Women and Multilateral Disarmament Forums’ (London, October 2015), 
http://www.article36.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Underrepresentation-women-FINAL1.pdf. 
62 For example Beatrice Fihn at ICAN, Rebecca Johnson at the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, 
Patricia Lewis at Chatham House, Ray Acheson at Reaching Critical Will, Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova at the James 
Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Grethe Østern at Norwegian Peoples Aid, Elizabeth Minor at Article 
36, Sara Sekkenes at UNDP, Josefin Lind and Clara Levin at Swedish Physicians against Nuclear Weapons and Mary 
Wareham at Human Rights Watch. 
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The ‘humanitarian initiative’ and campaign for a nuclear weapons prohibition treaty gathered 
momentum in the years after 2010.63 Using innovative diplomatic tactics, the founders of the 
initiative built a broad coalition of actors to challenge the creeping permanence of nuclear 
weapons in global politics and stagnation of disarmament diplomacy. Significantly boosting the 
overall volume and intensity of anti-nuclear advocacy, the movement could be understood as a 
‘cycle of protest’ in multilateral nuclear politics.64 In the following, we first discuss the motives 
and political ends of the supporters of the humanitarian initiative. Next, we analyse the ways in 
which the humanitarian initiative’s proponents exercised resistance to further their aims. 
The humanitarian initiative originated in a series of casual meetings (lunches) in 2009–
2010 of individuals who had collaborated on the ‘Oslo process’ to ban cluster munitions in the 
preceding years. Many NNWS officials had ostensibly grown quite sceptical about what could be 
achieved on nuclear disarmament within the NPT framework and were eager to find new ways of 
inducing change.65 Pivoting off the fractious NPT Review Conference in 2005 and the success of 
the Convention on Cluster Munitions in 2008, some had come to believe that recasting nuclear 
disarmament diplomacy in humanitarian terms could be a way of changing a stale debate.66 It 
seemed clear to them that what the disarmament process needed was not some ingenious 
technical fix or diplomatic horse-trade, but a fundamental normative reset. As long as nuclear 
weapons were seen as legitimate or even prestigious instruments of statecraft, they believed, 
disarmament would remain a Sisyphean task. Reasoning that the best way of expediting lasting 
change in global nuclear politics was to change nuclear culture, the group of people that initiated 
the humanitarian initiative implicitly relied on the Gramscian assumption that politics is 
‘downstream’ from culture. In Gramscian terms, the hegemonic ideology of nuclear weapons and 
nuclear discourses that selectively value and legitimise nuclear weapons – nuclear ‘common sense’ 
– needed to change in order to undermine hierarchical political structures of nuclear power. 
Employing the power-analytical perspective laid out above, we argue that the 
humanitarian initiative was motivated by a desire to eliminate, though nuclear disarmament, the 
nuclear-armed states’ ability to inflict catastrophic nuclear violence on societies (including their 
own). The initiative was, in other words, formed in opposition to the nuclear-armed states’ latent 
compulsory power, to wit, the nuclear powers’ ‘direct control’ over ‘the conditions of existence’ of 
other states and indeed all human civilisation.67 To further their goal of disarmament, however, 
the resistors took aim at the structural and productive relations of power that comprise and 
legitimise the status quo. Keen to challenge the structure of nuclear politics as a two-tiered 
hierarchy of ‘nuclear’ and ‘non-nuclear’-weapon states, the resistors sought to comprehensively 
delegitimise nuclear weapons. The aim of the resistors, in this view, was to unsettle the 
                                                
63 See Elizabeth Minor, ‘Changing the Discourse on Nuclear Weapons’, International Review of the Red Cross 97, no. 899 
(2015); Alexander Kmentt, ‘Development of the international initiative on the humanitarian impact of nuclear 
weapons and its effect on the nuclear weapons debate’, International Review of the Red Cross 97, no. 899 (2015). 
64 See in particular Sidney Tarrow, Struggle, Politics, and Reform (Center for International Studies: Cornell University, 
1989); David S. Meyer, ‘Protest and Political Opportunities’, Annual Review of Sociology 30 (2004). 
65 Interview with NNWS official, Geneva, 7 January 2016. 
66 For example, Patricia Lewis, ‘A New Approach to Nuclear Disarmament: Learning from International 
Humanitarian Law Success’, ICNND Research Report No. 13 (2009); Steffen Kongstad (Director General, 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs), ‘A Nordic Initiative for Nuclear Abolition’, hosted by Soka Gakkai 
International (SGI), International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) and Norwegian Institute of International 
Affairs (NUPI) (15 April 2009). 
67 Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, ‘Power in International Politics’, International Organization 59, no. 1 (2005): 
48. 
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 12
hierarchical structure of nuclear politics through influencing the cultural narratives and 
representations that make up the ‘nuclear discourse’. By changing the discourse, the resistors 
sought to refashion nuclear actors’ subjectivities and disrupt nuclear hegemony.  
The purpose of the humanitarian initiative was, and remains, to resist nuclear hegemony 
through delegitimising nuclear weapons. Playing on a varied repertoire of contention, the 
humanitarian initiative’s supporters have pursued this aim in a number of ways. For example, 
they have gathered and disseminated information about the humanitarian consequences of 
nuclear weapons, mobilised for political change through an overt ‘resistance rhetoric’ and 
adopted a legally binding instrument banning nuclear weapons. In doing so, the actors driving the 
humanitarian initiative have exercised compulsory, institutional and productive power to target 
the structural power of nuclear hierarchy. 
3.1 ‘Reframing’ nuclear weapons in disarmament diplomacy 
The resistors’ attempts at exercising productive power is the most appropriate starting point for 
analysis.68 The most straightforward means of changing the nuclear discourse, after all, was to use 
rhetoric, information and the testimonies of victims of nuclear violence – what Keck and Sikkink 
call ‘information politics’ – to challenge prevailing myths and preconceptions. The resistors’ first 
move was to instigate a basic discursive ‘reframing’ of nuclear disarmament.69 Strategically 
advancing an alternative political narrative in which nuclear weapons were morally and legally 
unacceptable on humanitarian grounds, the initiative’s architects were engaged in what 
Finnemore and Sikkink call ‘strategic social construction’.70 They were attempting to shift the 
debate away from the traditional focus on narrow national security considerations and towards a 
more holistic concern with human security and international law. By changing understandings 
about nuclear weapons, the expectation is that actors’ nuclear identities will shift and with them 
specific nuclear interests, in this case to a collective interest in disarmament. At the 2010 NPT 
Review Conference, a small group of states (most prominently Austria, Mexico, Norway and 
Switzerland) pressed successfully for the inclusion in the final document of an acknowledgement 
that ‘any use’ of nuclear weapons would have ‘catastrophic humanitarian consequences’.71 For 
casual readers, this statement might seem platitudinous, but in the world of nuclear diplomacy, 
this concession by the NWSs was significant. In practical terms, it gave advocates of 
disarmament political cover to pursue more radical disarmament initiatives under the banner of 
‘humanitarian disarmament’.72 
In 2012, a first of several joint statements on the ‘humanitarian dimension’ of nuclear 
disarmament was delivered to the PrepCom by the Swiss delegation. The 16 states that supported 
the statement maintained that, since the use of nuclear weapons would have ‘immense 
humanitarian consequences’, it was of ‘the outmost importance’ that nuclear weapons ‘never be 
                                                
68 See Anna Holzscheiter, ‘Discourse as Capability’, Millenium 33, no. 3 (2005). 
69 See John Borrie, ‘Humanitarian Reframing of Nuclear Weapons and the Logic of a Ban’, International Affairs 90, no. 
3 (2014). 
70 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, International 
Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 910. 
71 NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), New York (2010), para. I(a)(v).  
72 See Denice Garcia, ‘Humanitarian Security Regimes’, International Affairs 91, no. 1 (2015). 
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used again, under any circumstances.’73 Over the next few years, similar joint statements were 
made at multilateral conferences on behalf of an ever-growing group of NNWSs. Aiming to 
leverage the NNWSs’ collective strength in numbers, the states and NGOs promoting the 
initiative were eager to get as many states as possible on board.  While the first joint statement 
was supported by 16 states, the sixth and last, read out by the Austrian delegation to the 2015 
NPT Review Conference, was backed by 156 NNWSs. The humanitarian frame was further 
developed at UN Open-Ended Working Groups on nuclear disarmament in 2013 and 2016 and 
at a series of ad hoc inter-governmental conferences ‘on the humanitarian impact of nuclear 
weapons’ in 2013–2014. The latter – in Oslo (Norway), Nayarit (Mexico), and Vienna (Austria) – 
provided an arena for state and non-state actors to develop a common ‘humanitarian perspective’ 
on nuclear disarmament based on existing and new empirical research on the humanitarian, social 
and environmental effects of nuclear detonations that proved to be high in demand: more states 
attended the ad hoc humanitarian conferences in 2013 and 2014 than the meetings of the NPT 
review cycle in the same years.74  
The explicit aim of the humanitarian initiative was to delegitimise nuclear weapons by 
challenging and transforming the established nuclear discourse. This was a significant change. 
The focus was no longer on d legitimising specific nuclear practices, like testing, first use, or 
arms build-ups, but on the weapons themselves and, by extension, the practice of nuclear 
deterrence. Wrapping up the first conference on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons in 
March 2013, arguably the initiative’s break-through moment, the conference’s host, then foreign 
minister of Norway, Espen Barth Eide, said the conference had ‘succeeded in reframing the issue 
of nuclear weapons by introducing the humanitarian impacts and humanitarian concerns at the 
very centre of the discourse.’ Placing humanitarian values front and centre, he argued, ‘it 
becomes clear that [nuclear disarmament] is everybody’s concern and that it is equally legitimate 
for nuclear and non-nuclear states alike to care about this issue.’ 75 Another key individual in the 
humanitarian actor-network, Austria’s ambassador for disarmament, Alexander Kmentt, 
formulated the problem in the following way a few weeks later: 
 
[T]he discourse about nuclear weapons needs to be fundamentally changed. We will only 
manage the challenges posed by nuclear weapons if we move away from a debate that is 
still dominated by outdated military security concepts originating from cold war enemy 
and threat perceptions. Instead, we need to draw conclusions from our common 
understanding that any use of nuclear weapons would cause catastrophic consequences 
and be devastating in its effects for the whole world and all of humankind.76 
 
To turn the humanitarian ‘counter-hegemony’ into a genuine ideological alternative to the status 
quo, the resistors needed to fill the new frame with content; for the humanitarian frame to rattle 
                                                
73 Switzerland on behalf of 16 states, 2012 NPT PrepCom, 2 May 2012, 
http://reachingcriticalwill.org/documents/statements?toolbar_year=2012&toolbar_forum=2&toolbar_country=217
&toolbar_topic=0. 
74 ILPI, ‘Counting to Zero’, 10th edition, December 2016, http://nwp.ilpi.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/12/SF_BASIC-INDICATORS-2016B_FULLC.pdf. 
75 Espen B. Eide, Final Remarks at the Oslo Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, 5 March 
2013, https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/weapons_final/id716983/. 
76 Austria, statement to the 2013 NPT PrepCom, Geneva, 24 April, 
http://reachingcriticalwill.org/documents/statements?toolbar_year=2013&toolbar_forum=2&toolbar_country=16
&toolbar_topic=0. 
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the established nuclear discourse, it needed to be furnished, amplified, and embedded by 
international actors. This led the resistors to a second move: to mobilise and organise a 
‘transnational advocacy network’ (TAN) of the type theorised by IR scholars Margaret Keck and 
Kathryn Sikkink.77 This was concurrent with, and essential to, the reframing of nuclear weapons.  
In many ways, this reframing process was the humanitarian initiative in terms of how it was 
adapted, developed and advocated by its overlapping networks of actors. 
3.2. Building a transnational advocacy network 
TANs rely on many of the ‘strategies, tactics, and patterns of influence’ of social movements to 
challenge and contest norms.78 Rooted in what Keck and Sikkink call ‘principled ideas’ – in this 
case the idea that the humanitarian effects of nuclear conflict are unacceptable and that nuclear 
disarmament politics must change as a result – the humanitarian initiative was comprised of 
‘international and domestic NGOs, research and advocacy organisations, local social movements, 
foundations, the media, churches, trade unions, consumer organizations, intellectuals, parts of 
regional and international intergovernmental organizations, and parts of executive and/or 
parliamentary branches of governments’.79 At the heart of the network, serving as orchestrators 
and mobilisers, were ICAN and the handful of NGOs that made up its Steering Group,80 a group 
of states (especially the 16 that signed the first ‘joint statement on the humanitarian dimension of 
nuclear disarmament’ delivered at the 2012 NPT Preparatory Committee81), and a number of 
IGOs and think-tanks (such as United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the Oslo-based International Law and 
Policy Institute (ILPI)). States were key to this process in terms of their empowerment as 
decision-making actors in diplomatic fora but often working hand-in-glove with civil society 
organisations. 
The formation of the TAN promoting the humanitarian initiative was in part organic and 
in part intentional. It emerged from existing networks (for example around the Convention on 
Cluster Munitions) and steadily enrolled other actors and networks. The development and 
coordination of the TAN involved the use of power by the initiative’s core funders and leading 
NGOs. This is often sidelined as Miles Kahler remind us in his study of networks, ‘Network 
analysis has too often obscured or ignored questions of network power and power within 
networks, portraying networks as an antithesis of the hierarchical exercise of power’.82 Power was 
exercised in the humanitarian initiative’s networks through the forging of solidarity around a core 
                                                
77 Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘Transnational Advocacy Networks in International and Regional Politics’, 
International Social Science Journal 51, no. 159 (1999). 
78 Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘Transnational Advocacy Networks in International and Regional Politics’, 
International Social Science Journal 51, no. 159 (1999): 91. 
79 Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘Transnational Advocacy Networks in International and Regional Politics’, 
International Social Science Journal 51, no. 159 (1999): 91–2. 
80 The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, Article 36, International Physicians for the Prevention of 
Nuclear War, Latin America Human Security Network, Norwegian People’s Aid, PAX, Peace Boat, Swedish 
Physicians against Nuclear Weapons, Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom and Zambian 
Healthworkers for Social Responsibility. 
81 Austria, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Holy See, Egypt, Indonesia, Ireland, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, 
Nigeria, Norway, Philippines, South Africa, Switzerland. 
82 Miles Kahler, ‘Network Politics; Power, Agency, and Governance’ in Networked Politics: Agency, Power, and 
Governance, ed. Kahler (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), 3. 
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purpose, through the network’s nodes of connectivity that acted as informal ‘gatekeepers’ and 
‘NGO superpowers’, through strategic choices (such as funding and resource distribution) that 
shaped the structure of the network, and through the contested ways in which the humanitarian 
initiative ‘movement’ defined a nuclear weapons ban treaty as its obvious purpose.83 Moreover, 
the category of ‘global civil society’, with which many of the humanitarian initiative’s actors 
identify, is routinely characterised as an agent of empowerment, protest and resistance. The ways 
in which it is ‘constituted by the highly differentiated politics of power’ and exercises control, 
exclusion and discipline is often hidden, as Amoore and Langley demonstrate.84 For example, 
civil society voices that were sceptical or critical of a nuclear weapons ban treaty were typically 
excluded. 
On the face of it, there is no shortage of NGOs and academic programmes fully or in 
part devoted to reducing nuclear dangers. Yet, as Campbell Craig and Jan Ruzicka have 
documented, most of the NGOs, think tanks and university programmes that make up the ‘non-
proliferation complex’ are centred in and on the US and are politically and financially dependent 
on nuclear-dependent states or US foundations. As a consequence, the non-proliferation 
complex overwhelmingly advises incremental and cautious disarmament goals, primarily 
focussing on the US’ non-proliferation and arms control agenda.85 The architects of the 
humanitarian reframing consequently saw a need to identify and support civil society actors with 
more radical perspectives that could augment the humanitarian reframing and propose political 
actions. Academics from think tanks like UNIDIR and ILPI, known to the humanitarian 
initiative’s founders from the cluster munitions process, received funding (primarily from the 
Norwegian government) for multiple years of research and outreach on the humanitarian 
approach to nuclear disarmament. NGOs that had been highly effective in pushing for change in 
related fields – Article 36, Reaching Critical Will, Norwegian People’s Aid and others – received 
money to vamp up their work on the nuclear question. What in 2012 was still a relatively small 
campaign for nuclear disarmament – the Australian-based International Campaign to Abolish 
Nuclear Weapons – was chosen to chaperone a ‘new’ civil society movement. ICAN was given 
financial and administrative help to set up and run an office in Geneva and was made the 
Norwegian government’s official civil society partner at the Oslo Conference on the 
Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons in March 2013.86 This prepared the grounds for a re-
organisation (or re-networking) of the nuclear disarmament NGO community. Together, these 
actors sought to actively build a ‘counter-hegemony within an established hegemony’ through a 
process of ideological contestation.87 This had both iconoclastic and innovative aspects; while old 
truths were challenged, new concepts and information was brought to the fore. ICAN’s role as a 
coalition of several hundred NGOs and affiliates across over 100 countries was central to this 
process. This was recognised in October 2017 when it was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. 
The humanitarian values and international humanitarian law in which the network was 
rooted resonated with disparate actors and constituencies, from conservative religious institutions 
                                                
83 See Charli Carpenter, ‘Vetting the Advocacy Agenda: Network Centrality and the Paradox of Weapons Norms’, 
International Organization, 65, no. 1 (2011); Lara M. Coleman and Karen Tucker, ‘Between Discipline and Dissent’, 
Globalizations 8, no. 4 (2011). 
84 Louise Amoore and Paul Langley, ‘Ambiguities of Global Civil Society’, Review of International Studies 30, no. 1 
(2004): 99. 
85 Campbell Craig and Jan Ruzicka, ‘The Nonproliferation Complex’, Ethics & International Affairs 27, no. 3 (2013). 
86 Interview with NNWS official, Geneva, 7 January 2016. 
87 Robert Cox, ‘Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations’, Millennium 12, no. 2 (1983): 165. 
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and peace groups to liberal aid organisations, specialised disarmament NGOs and states from all 
continents. The choice of an inclusive and (on the face of it) politically unthreatening 
humanitarian frame was hardly accidental. Given the vast power asymmetry between the nuclear-
armed states and their supporters, on the one hand, and those demanding disarmament, on the 
other, it would be crucial for the latter to mobilise as many allies as possible through collective 
action around a common theme.88 The humanitarian message would be difficult to rebuff both 
for potential supporters and for the nuclear-armed states and their allies. The message reflected 
some of the core values of many of these states, their commitments to the international rule of 
law including humanitarian law, as well as the preamble to the NPT. From around 2012 onwards, 
the expanding TAN worked hard to develop the new framing, cascade it through established and 
new international diplomatic fora, and to develop and coordinate support from a host of 
different actors that formed an expanding network of networks.  
Through its application of productive power, the humanitarian initiative TAN developed 
a clear and focussed narrative representing nuclear disarmament as an urgent, humanitarian 
imperative.89 Traditionally a somewhat discrete area of international policy, nuclear disarmament 
was placed firmly in the context both of ‘humanitarian disarmament’, a framework that had 
underpinned the campaigns to prohibit anti-personal mines and cluster munitions convention, 
and of other ‘weapons of mass destruction’. The convening of the first Humanitarian 
Disarmament Campaigns Summit in 2012 was symptomatic of this wider reframing of the 
control and elimination of indiscriminate weapons.  
3.3 Mobilising diplomacy through ‘resistance rhetoric’  
A third form of productive power exercised through the humanitarian initiative TAN’s public 
outreach has been the development of an overt ‘resistance rhetoric’. Core members of the TAN 
have cast their agency in terms of ‘revolution’ and ‘revolt’, portraying their advocacy as a just 
struggle against the onerous domination of illegitimate nuclear power structures. While explicit 
references to struggle and resistance may in part reflect the instinctive views of certain 
individuals, the rhetoric seems to have had at least two instrumental functions. First, by 
representing the present as an extraordinary situation and the movement as being in dire need of 
reinforcement, the resistance rhetoric served to mobilise support for the cause. Second, by 
alluding to heroic struggles against oppressive structures, the resistance rhetoric calls on the 
humanitarian initiative’s supporters to stand defiant in the face of expected counter-resistance by 
the major powers and their allies seeking to perpetuate those structures.  
From a theoretical perspective, the purpose of these discursive shifts was to transform 
the subjectivities of core actors; while the NNWSs would be redefined from passive or ‘subaltern’ 
bystanders to active stakeholders in humanitarian diplomacy, the NWSs’ would be recast from 
‘responsible nuclear sovereigns’ entitled to practice nuclear deterrence to irresponsible possessors 
                                                
88 Tom Long, ‘Small States, Great Power? Gaining Influence Through Intrinsic, Derivative, and Collective Power’, 
International Studies Review 19, no. 2 (2016). Actor-network theory has been applied to nuclear weapons and 
disarmament in Nick Ritchie, ‘Relinquishing nuclear weapons: identities, networks and the British bomb’, International 
Affairs 86, no. 2 (2010); Steven Flank, ‘Exploding the Black Box’, Security Studies 3, no. 2 (1993);  Mike Bourne, 
‘Invention and uninvention in nuclear weapons politics’, Critical Studies on Security 4, no. 1 (2016). 
89 Magnus Løvold, Beatrice Fihn and Thomas Nash, ‘Humanitarian Perspectives and the Campaign for an 
International Ban on Nuclear Weapons’, in Viewing Nuclear Weapons Through a Humanitarian Lens, eds John Borrie and 
Tim Caughley (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2013), 146. 
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of uncivilised weapons of mass destruction. Particular subjectivities of nuclear victim, nuclear 
disarmer, and nuclear resistor were empowered within the discourse, the nuclear possessors and 
their enablers were ‘othered’ as ‘anti-humanitarian’; while the dependence of the nuclear-armed 
states and their allies on nuclear weapons was framed as illegitimate and oppressive, the 
humanitarian initiative was portrayed as legitimate and emancipatory. These self–other 
constructions were arguably essential for sustaining the TAN both in terms of solidarity and in 
terms of enabling the moral humanitarian challenge through reframing to make political sense. 
Matthew Bolton and Elizabeth Minor have argued that ICAN’s strategy marked the direct 
application of critical, post-positivist IR theory to practical multilateral diplomacy.90 ICAN 
campaigners are consciously aware of the (productive) power of culture and language, Bolton and 
Minor argue. ICAN’s public communication is carefully thought through and tailored; discursive 
representations and metaphors are deliberately employed as instruments in an asymmetric 
political conflict with the apologists of nuclear weapons and deterrence. 
‘Resistance rhetoric’ has been used in practice in a number of ways by those that are 
either identified or self-identify as part of ‘global civil society’. In a 2015 article for the Huffington 
Post, ICAN’s executive director, Beatrice Fihn, points out that the humanitarian initiative has 
been called an ‘uprising’, a ‘revolution’, and ‘a fight against nuclear apartheid’.91 The humanitarian 
movement, Fihn argues, reflects a ‘battle for power’ in which NNWSs are attempting to take 
‘control over the discussion’ and to ‘forge their own path’ to achieve progress on nuclear 
disarmament. This statement should not be understood merely as a description of an empirical 
process. Fihn’s observation is also intended to have a political effect; by describing the NNWSs’ 
uprising, she wills it into existence. Quoting Martin Luther King’s assertion that ‘freedom is 
never voluntarily given by the oppressor; it must be demanded by the oppressed’ (a ‘meme’ with 
this quote was also shared on ICAN’s Instagram and Twitter accounts), Fihn simultaneously aims 
to convince outsiders of the nobility of ICAN’s cause and to prepare those already converted for 
counter-resistance.92 In fact, in ICAN’s official communication, the term ‘resistance’ is often used 
to describe the countermoves of the nuclear-armed states: ICAN supporters must push on 
‘despite the strong resistance from nuclear-armed nations’;93 likeminded states should ‘work in 
close partnership with civil society to bring about a nuclear weapons ban regardless of resistance 
from states possessing the weapons;’94 ‘resistance to a treaty banning nuclear weapons is 
inevitable.’95 More accurately, this was counter-resistance to the initiative’s resistance to 
established nuclear power structures. 
On social media platforms Twitter, Facebook and Instagram – important outreach tools 
for disarmament advocates – the hashtag ‘#resist’ accompanied countless messages about the 
humanitarian imperative and urgency of nuclear abolition. ‘Join the resistance!’ exclaimed several 
                                                
90 Matthew Bolton and Elizabeth Minor, ‘The Discursive Turn Arrives in Turtle Bay’, Global Policy 7, no. 3 (2016). 
91 Beatrice Fihn, ‘A Silent Battle for Power’, Huffington Post, 11 September 2015, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/beatrice-fihn/a-silent-battle-of-power_b_8508882.html. 
92 Beatrice Fihn, ‘A Silent Battle for Power’, Huffington Post, 11 September 2015, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/beatrice-fihn/a-silent-battle-of-power_b_8508882.html. 
93 ICAN, ‘Ban Nuclear Weapons’, October 2015, http://www.icanw.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/ICAN-
Australia-2015.pdf, 4. 
94 ICAN, ‘Ban Nuclear Weapons Now’, July 2013, http://www.icanw.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/08/BanNuclearWeaponsNow.pdf, 3. 
95 ICAN, statement to the UN OEWG on nuclear disarmament, Geneva, 11 May 2016, 
http://www.icanw.org/campaign-news/public-and-parliamentary-support-for-a-treaty-banning-nuclear-weapons/. 
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tweets urging users to sign up to ICAN’s call for the prohibition of nuclear weapons.96 ‘We are 
the resistance and we are banning nuclear weapons this year’, tweeted ICAN’s official account on 
22 January 2017.97 This and other social media posts were illustrated with pictures of Princess 
Leia, a leader of the ‘Rebel Alliance’ in the fictional Star Wars universe. On blogs and in 
mainstream media publications, ICAN’s campaign was described as a struggle against ‘diplomatic 
colonialism’ and the humanitarian initiative as an ‘uprising’ of non-nuclear states.98According to 
an ICAN press release disseminated on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the atomic 
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the humanitarian initiative constitutes ‘a revolutionary 
movement’ of NNWSs and NGOs.99 For Ray Acheson, director of Reaching Critical Will (the 
disarmament programme of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom) and an 
influential figure within the campaign, the humanitarian initiative and push for a ban treaty (more 
about the ban treaty later) represented ‘a revolt of the vast majority of states against the violence, 
intimidation, and injustice perpetuated by those supporting these weapons of mass 
destruction.’100 Writing in the First Committee Monitor, a publication of Reaching Critical Will read 
by many campaigners and disarmament diplomats, Acheson makes it clear that her use of the 
term ‘revolt’ is by no means casual. Rather, it is informed by critical theory and literature: ‘Camus 
explored the theme of revolt across many books and novels, finding that struggle not only “gives 
value to life” but also that it is an obligation, even in the face of adversity, power, and 
overwhelming odds’.101 Acheson’s writing clearly illustrates the idea that resistance is often 
experienced as autotelic, i.e. as worthwhile in and of itself.  
(Deceased) moral authorities and resistance heroes like Nelson Mandela, Mahatma 
Ghandi and Martin Luther King Jr are often enlisted to the cause of disarmament. The front 
page of ICAN’s website sports a ‘meme’ featuring actor Martin Sheen (who is a proclaimed 
supporter of ICAN) stating that ‘if Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr were alive today, they 
would be part of ICAN.’102 ‘We are inspired by Nelson Mandela, who viewed the struggle against 
the nuclear weapon as inextricably intertwined with the struggles to end racism and colonialism’, 
the Norwegian branch of ICAN proclaims on its website: Mandela ‘fought for ending legislated 
minority rule in all its manifestations, be it the apartheid regime or the international framework of 
the nuclear weapons regime.’103 Together, these representations are meant to add weight to the 
                                                
96 E.g. ICAN (@nuclearban), tweet on 29 June 2017, https://twitter.com/nuclearban/status/880438887906148352.  
97 ICAN (@nuclearban), tweet on 22 January 2017, https://twitter.com/nuclearban/status/823095142752153600. 
98 Greg Mello, ‘NPT consensus failure a good thing’, Pressenza, 10 June 2015, 
http://www.pressenza.com/2015/06/npt-consensus-failure-a-good-thing-108-countries-pledge-to-help-ban-nuclear-
weapons/ (accessed 28 December 2016); Daniela Varano and Rebecca Johnson, ‘NPT: nuclear colonialism versus 
democratic disarmament’, Open Democracy, 21 May 2015, https://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/rebecca-johnson-
daniela-varano/npt-nuclear-colonialism-versus-democratic-disarmament; Tobias Matern, ‘Auf UN-Agenda’, 
Süddeutsche Zeitung, 21 August 2016, http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/atomwaffen-auf-un-agenda-1.3130428; 
Dan Zak, ‘U.N. nuclear conference collapses over WMD-free zone in the Middle East’, Washington Post, 22 May 
2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/un-nuclear-conference-collapses-over-wmd-free-
zone-in-the-middle-east/2015/05/22/8c568380-fe39-11e4-8c77-
bf274685e1df_story.html?utm_term=.ce68d3a3b977. 
99 ICAN, ‘Media Update: 70 Years Since the Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki’, 2015. 
100 Ray Acheson, ‘Revolt’, First Committee Monitor, no 5, 31 October 2016, 
http://reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/unga/2016/fcm/11259-2016-no-5. 
101 Ray Acheson, ‘Revolt’, First Committee Monitor, no 5, 31 October 2016, 
http://reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/unga/2016/fcm/11259-2016-no-5). 
102 ICAN, http://www.icanw.org (accessed 27 November 2016). 
103 ICAN Norway, ‘Next Stop: South Africa’, http://www.icannorway.no/campaign-news/next-stop-south-
africa/#.WGK8z7GZP-Z. 
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cause of disarmament, presenting it as a noble and radical movement to end oppression. Nuclear 
weapons are ‘morally intolerable and illegitimate instruments of terror’, Fihn argues.104 For 
Acheson, the states supporting the ban movement are acting ‘as part of a broader movement of 
governments and civil societies seeking to build a world that does not rely on violence as the 
currency of power, but rather on cooperation, peace, and justice.’105 The humanitarian ‘uprising’, 
in other words, is an urgent struggle for justice. 
Images of resistance and struggle for justice have also been promoted by NNWSs in the 
TAN. ‘[T]here is no force that can stop the steady march of those who believe in human security, 
democracy and international law’, argued the Costa Rican official Maritza Chan at the 2015 NPT 
Review Conference, adding that history ‘honors only the brave, those who have the courage to 
think differently and dream of a better future for all.’106 In an article for the journal Global Policy, 
Chan proclaimed, on behalf of her country, that ‘we are proud to stand on the front lines in the 
battle for a nuclear-free world.’107 The South African delegation to the 2015 NPT Review 
Conference argued that, ‘[g]iven that 45 years have now passed since the entry-into-force of the 
Treaty [the NPT], we can no longer afford to strike hollow agreements every five years which 
only seem to perpetuate the status quo. The time has come to bring a decisive end to what 
amounts to “nuclear apartheid”.’108 The ‘overwhelming support’ for the humanitarian initiative 
among NNWSs and civil society actors, argued the Kenyan delegation to the UN General 
Assembly in 2014, ‘demonstrates the growing opposition to the constant threat that nuclear 
weapons pose. People are beginning to stand up. Very soon they will say “enough”.’109 Confronting 
the legalistic justifications for nuclear hegemony, New Zealand argued in 2014 that the NPT ‘was 
never about creating a permanent right for some to retain nuclear weapons. Article VI of the 
Treaty promised that at some point beyond the Treaty’s adoption in 1968, effective measures 
would be put in place leading to nuclear disarmament.’ After more than four decades without 
such measures being implemented, ‘non-nuclear-weapon States certainly have a right to ask, if 
not now, when?’110 For Guatemala, the humanitarian initiative reflected the urgency with which 
NNWSs saw the matter of nuclear disarmament. It was time for the NNWSs to ‘act and break 
the deadlock’ despite the NWSs’ attempts at protecting the status quo.111 For the Jamaican 
diplomat Shorna-Kay Richards, the ‘principles of equality and justice are at the core’ of the 
humanitarian approach. The humanitarian initiative, in her view, had empowered NNWSs, 
proving ‘that the non-nuclear weapons States have a say in nuclear disarmament issues. Our voice 
                                                
104 Beatrice Fihn, ‘From Hiroshima to Marshall Islands’, Huffington Post, 28 August 2015, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/beatrice-fihn/from-hiroshima-to-marshal_b_8056856.html. 
105 Ray Acheson, ‘Uprising’, NPT News in Review 13, no. 17 (2015).  
106 Costa Rica, statement to the 2015 NPT RevCon, New York, 22 May 2015, 
http://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-
fora/npt/revcon2015/statements/22May_CostaRica.pdf. 
107 Maritza Chan, ‘Non-Nuclear Weapons States Must Lead in Shaping International Norms on Nuclear Weapons’, 
Global Policy 7, no. 3 (2016). 
108 South Africa, statement to the 2015 NPT RevCon, New York, 29 April 2015, 
http://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-
fora/npt/revcon2015/statements/29April_SouthAfrica.pdf. Emphasis in original. 
109 Kenya, statement to the UNGA First Committee, A/C.1/69/PV.6, New York, 13 October 2014, 7. Emphasis in 
original. 
110 New Zealand, statement to the UNGA First Committee, A/C.1/69/PV.3, New York, 8 October 2014, 21. 
111 Guatemala, A statement to the UNGA First Committee, /C.1/70/PV.11, New York, 21 October 2015, 8. 
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matters. We have agency.’112 The heightened sense of empowerment among NNWS officials is a 
testament to the TAN’s successful reshaping of its own constituents’ subjectivities. The rhetoric 
of resistance emboldened NNWS officials to support radical measures, ‘refashioning the subject 
within power’.113 
3.4 Banning nuclear weapons 
Next to the strategic reframing of nuclear weapons, formation of a TAN and development of a 
radical counter-discourse rooted in the idea of resistance, a fourth major action undertaken to 
challenge the NWSs’ grip on the nuclear discourse was to campaign for, and bring about, the 
negotiation of a nuclear weapons prohibition treaty. For many of the humanitarian initiative’s 
supporters, the purpose of the movement had always been to pave the way for such negotiations. 
The fact that the NWSs and many of their allies would almost certainly not sign such an 
instrument was precisely the point: the purpose of the new treaty was not first and foremost to 
regulate the destruction of nuclear stockpiles, but to codify and broadcast its signatories’ 
resistance to the status quo and their collective expectations of change. In contrast to the vaguely 
worded NPT, which leaders of the NWSs argue gives them a ‘right’ to possess nuclear 
weapons,114 the new treaty would render it impossible for the NWSs to plead special entitlements. 
The institutional power of a formal treaty under UN auspices would give advocates of 
disarmament a potentially powerful tool to shake up the established discourse and revalidate the 
importance of nuclear disarmament.115 
The successful alignment of nuclear disarmament with humanitarian law established and 
embedded a logical new norm that nuclear weapons should be subject to a legal prohibition to 
precipitate their elimination in order to prevent their use and the unacceptable consequences that 
would follow. This new, or perhaps rehabilitated, nuclear narrative and its norms of behaviour 
centred on a formal prohibition were successfully cascaded through the wider TAN by a core 
group of states and NGOs. Indeed, the campaign for a ban fits well with Finnemore and 
Sikkink’s model of the ‘life cycle’ of norms as a process of ‘emergence’, ‘cascade’ and 
‘internalisation’.116 The treaty’s endorsement and promulgation by moral authorities like the ICRC 
and the Holy See was an important step in this process.117 The adoption of the ban treaty as the 
humanitarian initiative’s chief practical aim was itself an expression of productive power 
exercised within the TAN. Indeed, the exercise of productive power both within and by the TAN 
was intrinsic to the development and cascade of a specific norm of universal legal prohibition 
nested within a web of established norms, rules and institutions. In particular, the shift in the 
                                                
112 Shorna-Kay Richards, lecture in Mexico City, 7 July 2016, http://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/Presentation-at-2016-Summer-School-on-Nuclear-Disarmament-and-Non-proliferation-
FINAL-1.pdf. 
113 James Brassett, ‘British Comedy, Global Resistance’, European Journal of International Relations 22, no. 1 (2016): 174. 
Emphasis original. 
114 Nick Ritchie, ‘Valuing and Devaluing Nuclear Weapons’, Contemporary Security Policy 34, no. 1 (2013): 157. 
115 Kjølv Egeland, ‘Kjølv Egeland, ‘Banning the Bomb: Inconsequential Posturing or Meaningful Stigmatization?’, 
Global Governance 24, no. 1 (2018). 
116 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, International 
Organization 52, no. 4 (1998). 
117 On the role of ‘agenda vetting’ in transnational advocacy networks see Louise Amore, ‘Situating Resistance’ in The 
Global Resistance Reader, ed. Amore (London: Routledge, 2005); Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘Transnational 
Advocacy Networks in International and Regional Politics’, International Social Science Journal 51, no. 159 (1999). 
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Non-Aligned Movement orthodoxy and the preferences of some NGOs (including ICAN) from 
preferring an all-encompassing Nuclear Weapons Convention to acceptance of a ban treaty as a 
necessary and achievable interim step was an important part of the process. Moreover, capturing 
the delegitimation of nuclear weapons in a legal instrument under UN auspices would translate 
the productive power of the humanitarian initiative into institutional and compulsory power. 
The campaign for a nuclear weapons ban was first championed by ICAN, but as time 
went on, more and more NNWS governments planted their flags in the ban camp. Between 2012 
and 2016, a growing number of states explicitly spoke out in favour of the idea of adopting a 
treaty banning nuclear weapons. In practical terms, the idea of adopting a new legal instrument 
was pursued in two UN Open-Ended Working Groups (OEWG) on nuclear disarmament. The 
first of these groups, convened in Geneva in 2013, was mandated by the 67th UN General 
Assembly (2012–2013). Despite counter-resistance by the NWSs, a large majority of the UN’s 
member states agreed to ‘develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament 
negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons’.118 The 
process to move towards a negotiating mandate for a prohibition treaty really gathered 
momentum after the failure of the 2015 NPT RevCon to agree a final consensus document. The 
political fallout of the RevCon led to the approval by the UN General Assembly in October 2015 
of a second UN Open-Ended Working Group on multilateral nuclear disarmament. The group 
met during 2016 and recommended ‘the convening, by the General Assembly, of a conference in 
2017 […] to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards 
their total elimination.’119 The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was adopted by 
majority vote on 7 July 2017. 
For many of the humanitarian initiative TAN’s core actors, the NWSs’ reaction to the 
proposed ban seemed to demonstrate its potential. While in public arguing that the ban would 
either be ignored or have only negative impacts on disarmament efforts, US officials secretly 
instructed NATO allies to vote against the convening of ban-treaty negotiations because they 
believed a ban could delegitimise nuclear deterrence.120 Other NWSs made similar statements. 
Russian officials arguably went further in their critique of the ban, labelling the strategy 
‘catastrophic’.121 This ‘counter-resistance’ and ‘counter-framing’ was to be expected. Forms of 
resistance and dissent that challenge established power structures are often ‘interpreted as a threat 
to be contained or eliminated’, as Coleman and Tucker note.122 
While the ban treaty may itself be understood as an expression of institutional power – 
insofar as its supporters are attempting to indirectly influence and constrain behaviour via the 
treaty – the process that led to its adoption was also in part brought about through the exercise 
of institutional power. Aided by the growing openness of UN fora and diplomatic conferences to 
NGO participation,123 the champions of the ban treaty relied on the legitimacy and authority of 
existing institutions like the UN and NPT to build support for the initiative. Taking the 
                                                
118 UN General Assembly, ‘Taking Forward Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations’, A/67/57, New York, 4 
January 2013. 
119 UN General Assembly, ‘Taking Forward Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations’, A/71/371, 1 New 
York, September 2016, 18. 
120 See ICAN, ‘US pressured NATO states to vote not to a ban’, 1 November 2016, 
http://www.icanw.org/campaign-news/us-pressures-nato-states-to-vote-no-to-the-ban-treaty/. 
121 Russia, statement to the UNGA First Committee, A/C.1/71/PV.22, New York, 27 October 2016, 21. 
122 Lara M. Coleman and Karen Tucker, ‘Between Discipline and Dissent’, Globalizations 8, no. 4 (2011): 405. 
123 Peter Willetts, Non-Governmental Organisation in World Politics (London: Routledge, 2011), 133. 
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humanitarian initiative and idea of a ban treaty to the established forums, the TAN was able to 
use the very institutions that tacitly legitimise nuclear weapons to instead delegitimise them.124 
The shift from ad hoc intergovernmental conferences to a formal UN process was therefore a 
key development. The second OEWG in 2016 was pivotal. It brought the initiative and the idea 
of a ban treaty into the UN architecture and imbued it with considerable institutional power. This 
further legitimised the initiative’s discourse and gave it political momentum. The treaty’s 
proponents explicitly argued that a prohibition treaty as well as other measures identified by the 
2016 UN Open-Ended Working Group would constitute the ‘effective measures’ for nuclear 
disarmament called for under the NPT’s Article VI. The global South has a long history of 
disarmament activism at the UN, primarily through the collective of the Non-Aligned 
Movement, which has framed disarmament and development as inter-related issues. The UN is 
the premier vehicle through which less powerful states can create new institutions and 
instruments to promote alternative norms, rules and goals to those of the major powers.125 It was 
promoted as the primary forum for disarmament owing to its inclusivity as a world organisation 
and what Inis Claude identified as its powerful collective legitimation function.126 The UN, then, 
‘offered a platform on which all states were represented and, if organised in large groups, could 
influence the conduct of world politics. This UN potential was explored by NAM, and its 
members learned how to use the system to their own advantage.’127  
The treaty hold-outs, which are primarily nuclear-armed states and their allies, cannot be 
forced to join the treaty and disarm, but they will be affected by it because it is embedded in the 
authority of two core institutions of global nuclear governance: the United Nations and the NPT. 
This reflects a third form of power exercised by the TAN: compulsory power. This, however, 
takes a very specific form of normative censure. Barnett and Duvall make the point that 
‘[c]ompulsory power is not limited to material resources; it also entails symbolic and normative 
resources’.128 The TAN has tried to exercise direct compulsory normative power to compel states 
to change their policies through normative censure, a process that will be aided by the 
negotiation of the prohibition treaty. Some have also attempted to exercise compulsory power 
through a nuclear weapons divestment campaign. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Identifying how international power structures are challenged and transformed through collective 
action is crucial to understanding change in international relations. The humanitarian initiative 
demonstrates how a network of the relatively disempowered can affect global politics through 
practices of resistance. As reflected by the 122 states that voted for it, the sharp counter-
resistance from the nuclear-armed, and the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to ICAN, the 
adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was a major diplomatic 
achievement. The humanitarian initiative, we have argued, is best be understood as a multi-
                                                
124 Nick Ritchie, ‘Legitimizing and Delegitimizing Nuclear Weapons’, in Viewing Nuclear Weapons through a 
Humanitarian Lens, eds John Borrie and Tim Caughley (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2013). 
125 Adam Bower, ‘Norms Without the Great Powers’, International Studies Quarterly 17, no. 3 (2015): 349. 
126 Inis Claude, ‘Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations’,  International Organization 20, 
no. 3 (1966). 
127 Dan Plesch, ‘The South and disarmament at the UN’, Third World Quarterly 37, no. 7 (2016): 1211. 
128 Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, ‘Power in International Politics’, International Organization 59, no. 1 (2005): 
50. 
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layered social resistance movement characterised by the following features: it was oppositional, 
creative and heterogeneous nature; it was anchored in clear but flexible set of principled ideas; it 
was connected to wider struggles against oppressive power structures; it was embedded in 
historical experience and it was enacted in traditional diplomatic arenas. These seven features, we 
claim, make up a family resemblance characteristic of what we call ‘the diplomacy of 
resistance’.129  
The purpose of the humanitarian initiative was to challenge the set of hegemonic 
structures and practices that selectively legitimise, regulate, and discipline the appropriation of 
nuclear weapons, technologies, materials and knowledge. According to the architects of the 
initiative, this oligarchic global nuclear structure was held in place by a web of concepts, 
preconceptions, assumptions and cultural narratives that legitimised the existence of nuclear 
weapons, not least the nuclear arsenals of the five states defined by the NPT as ‘nuclear-weapon 
states’. Changing the ‘nuclear discourse’, they believed, was necessary (though not sufficient) to 
bring about a world without nuclear weapons. Given the absence of media attention and mass 
public protest that might galvanise change at the national level, the humanitarian initiative’s 
architects focused their efforts on the diplomatic level. Drawing on Cox, we have argued that the 
humanitarian initiative constitutes a form of counter-hegemony within global nuclear politics. 
Constructing this counter-hegemony involved discursive and diplomatic strategies to effect 
change through existing and new institutions and intellectual resources. The extent to which this 
is novel or transformatory remains to be seen. The initiative can certainly be framed as the latest 
turn in ‘cycle of protest’ against nuclear weapons, but in the context of the repetitive gridlocked 
politics of nuclear disarmament of the past two decades it surely represents an important change.  
To challenge the established nuclear discourse, the actors driving the humanitarian 
initiative relied on a varied repertoire of contention, namely: the use of productive power to 
reframe nuclear weapons as ‘strategic social construction’; mobilising and coordinating a network 
of the like-minded (in this case a fluid transnational ‘network of networks’); cohering and 
validating the network through resistance rhetoric, and channelling resistance into a new legal 
instrument as the logical outcome of the reframing move. The diplomacy of resistance cannot be 
understood without serious engagement with structures and relations of power. A power-analytic 
approach illuminates the processes, opportunities and limits of the humanitarian initiative. Our 
analysis shows that the power of the network is intrinsic to the diplomacy of resistance. The 
primarily normative basis of power exercised by the humanitarian initiative is a function of an 
obvious but fundamental asymmetry of power between the nuclear and non-nuclear armed: the 
initiative does not have the power to change nuclear-weapons policies directly. Instead, they 
necessarily have to pursue indirect means through a diplomacy of resistance, in this case by 
changing the legal and normative context in which nuclear-armed states and their supporters 
make decisions about nuclear weapons. In order to level the playing field against the nuclear-
armed states and their allies – large, wealthy, veto-wielding states with considerable 
power (compulsory, structural, institutional and productive) – the supporters of the humanitarian 
initiative relied on ‘information politics’, network building, and strength in numbers. The 
movement’s effectiveness was to a large extent down to its key members’ ability to cultivate a 
coalitional logic that allowed actors with different ideas and agendas to pull in the same direction. 
                                                
129 For Wittgenstein, concepts have no ‘essential core’ of meaning. Rather, concepts describe a ‘network’ of 
‘overlapping and criss-crossing’ phenomena. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Chichester: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2009), 36 (para. 66). 
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Through the dissemination of reports and articles, social media outreach and official statements 
to diplomatic forums, core actors in the transnational advocacy network that constituted the 
humanitarian initiative developed an effective counter-discourse. This highlighted the testimonies 
of victims of nuclear violence and the massive humanitarian and environmental harm from 
nuclear detonations, and it rejected the legitimacy of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence. As 
their immediate and most important goal, the supporters of the initiative pushed the idea of 
delegitimising nuclear weapons by negotiating a treaty to ban them. This translated the 
productive power of the network into institutional power through the authority of UN to create a 
new legal instrument that would become a tool for the exercise of normative-legal compulsory 
power. The power of the network stemmed both from its numbers, in terms of the size of the 
network, and authority, in terms of the type of actors and their authoritative relationship to the 
issue(s) of concern, not least those with substantial moral authority such as the Hibakusha, 
Vatican and ICRC. The number and type of actors in a network affects the authority of the 
discourse (productive power), access to and effect through institutions and how these combine to 
effect wider change, for example through legal-normative compulsory power. The power of the 
humanitarian initiative therefore relates in many ways to Arendt’s definition of power as a 
collective action: power is the ability to act in concert, whether to legitimise, compel or resist.130 
Power, as something quite distinct from violence or resources, ‘always stands in need of 
numbers’.131 
Moulding and sustaining the network itself has also been an exercise of power, primarily 
structural and productive power within the network. It is about discourses of normative 
requirements in relation to an issue (something should be done), of legitimate subjects (we are the 
ones that should do it) and of conditions of possibility (we can effect change). It also involves 
institutional power of sorts insofar as actors within a network are not all in direct relationships 
with each other but are affected indirectly through the network. The network, here, takes on the 
form of an informal institution of rules, norms and practices influenced by those actors that 
constitute the network’s core nodes, for example the Norwegian foreign ministry, ICAN, the 
ICRC, and the wider Geneva community of NGOs, IGOs, and diplomats in the case of the 
humanitarian initiative. These actors play a central role in the mobilisation of a wider network of 
networks through articulation of discourses and agenda setting, or ‘agenda vetting’, as Carpenter 
puts it.132 Structural position (and hence structural power) within a network clearly matters, but in 
the more discrete setting of a TAN, productive power is key, even though structural position, 
material resources, and institutional practices are significant.133  
The negotiation of the TPNW is a formidable achievement, but the prospect of 
significant change in nuclear policies remains uncertain. The actors and networks comprising the 
TAN lack material compulsory power. The productive power to shape the systems of meaning 
around the illegitimacy of nuclear weapons can be effective, but advocates of disarmament are 
competing with other systems of meaning and deeply embedded ‘nuclearised’ identities in which 
nuclear weapons are highly valued and that will be difficult to transform. The TAN may have 
successfully exercised institutional power through the UN and NPT, but the likely result in the 
                                                
130 Hannah Arendt, On Violence (London: Penguin, 1969), 44. 
131 Hannah Arendt, On Violence (London: Penguin, 1969), 42. 
132 Carli Carpenter, ‘Vetting the Advocacy Agenda’, International Organization 65, no. 1 (2011). 
133 Kathryn Sikkink, ‘The Power of Networks in International Politics’, in Networked Politics, ed. Miles Kahler (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2015), 240. 
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short–medium term will be continued division in the NPT. This will only change when the 
weight of normative pressure for a shift in nuclear weapons policies by the nuclear-armed, 
combined with other pressures and incentives, becomes irresistible. More importantly, the TAN 
lacks structural power. The nuclear-armed states and their supporters, in contrast, enjoy 
considerable structural power not just through the structures of global nuclear politics, but 
through other military, economic and political privileges. It is this structural power that places the 
non-nuclear-armed in the position of nuclear subordination that is now being actively resisted 
and challenged through the humanitarian initiative and the prohibition treaty. 
 The literature on transnational advocacy networks and Barnett and Duvall’s power-
resistance framework are important conceptual tools to help us understand the significant 
political effects of the humanitarian initiative. Nevertheless, the initiative and the prohibition 
treaty paint a more complex picture that can be explained through the ‘diplomacy of resistance’ 
presented here. More broadly, this case demonstrates that understanding how hierarchical 
international power structures are challenged and transformed through collective action is crucial 
to developing a more robust account of international relations. 
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